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Abstract
In this paper, we discuss one particular feature of In-
ternet voting, veriability, against the background of scien-
tic literature and experiments in the Netherlands. In order
to conceptually clarify what veriability is about, we distin-
guish classical veriability from constructive veriability in
both individual and universal verication. In classical indi-
vidual veriability, a proof that a vote has been counted can
be given without revealing the vote. In constructive individ-
ual veriability, a proof is only accepted if the witness (i.e.
the vote) can be reconstructed. Analogous concepts are de-
ned for universal veriability of the tally. The RIES sys-
tem used in the Netherlands establishes constructive indi-
vidual veriability and constructive universal veriability,
whereas many advanced cryptographic systems described
in the scientic literature establish classical individual ver-
iability and classical universal veriability.
If systems with a particular kind of veriability continue
to be used successfully in practice, this may inuence the
way in which people are involved in elections, and their im-
age of democracy. Thus, the choice for a particular kind
of veriability in an experiment may have political con-
sequences. We recommend making a well-informed demo-
cratic choice for the way in which both individual and uni-
versal veriability should be realised in Internet voting, in
order to avoid these unconscious political side-effects of the
technology used. The safest choice in this respect, which
maintains most properties of current elections, is classi-
cal individual veriability combined with constructive uni-
versal veriability. We would like to encourage discussion
about the feasibility of this direction in scientic research.
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1. Introduction
In the Netherlands, several experiments with online vot-
ing have been conducted during the last couple of years. In
the European Elections 2004, Dutch citizens staying abroad
were allowed to vote online. The system used, called KOA
(Kiezen Op Afstand), was designed by Logica CMG for the
Dutch Ministry of Domestic Affairs [22]. Meanwhile, a sec-
ond system was being developed by the “waterschap” (pub-
lic water management authority) of Rijnland, in cooperation
with the company Mullpon. This system was labelled RIES
(Rijnland Internet Election System), and has been used in
the elections of the “waterschappen” Rijnland and Dommel
in fall 2004 [12].
There are several interesting features offered by the sys-
tems experimented with in the Netherlands. For example,
the KOA system uses personalised (randomised) ballots,
in order to prevent attacks by e.g. viruses residing on the
voter’s computer. Moreover, the counting software, written
at the Radboud University Nijmegen, was specified and ver-
ified using formal methods. Unfortunately, the KOA sys-
tem does not offer verifiability to the voters, and is there-
fore likely never to transcend the level of small-scale sub-
elections that will not have a profound influence on the over-
all result.
The RIES system does offer verifiability, and people
seem to appreciate this.1 However, the kind of verifiability
that is offered by RIES seems to be quite different from the
verifiability that is offered in more advanced cryptographic
systems in the literature. In some sense, RIES seems to be
too verifiable to provide resistance against coercion or vote
buying.
1 Much depends on the interface though. Before RIES was actually
used in an election, a trial session revealed that a too difficult veri-
fication procedure decreases trust in the system among voters. The
user-friendliness of the verification procedure was improved after the
trial.
In this paper, we investigate the concept of verifiability
vis-a-vis the scientific literature and the concrete develop-
ments in the Netherlands. We propose a distinction between
various concepts of verifiability, and argue that the choice
between these concepts should be the outcome of a political
discussion, rather than the unconscious influence of techno-
social developments.
2. Voter-Verifiable Elections
Verifiability of electronic voting systems has achieved a
great deal of attention in computer science literature. In the
context of electronic voting machines (DRE’s), much dis-
cussion has taken place around the possible introduction of
a voter-verified audit trail (VVAT)2. Typically, this includes
a paper copy of each vote being kept as a backup trail for re-
covery or recount. This should increase trust in the proper
operation of the black-box DRE machines. Also, crypto-
graphic receipts have been proposed, e.g. in [6].
However, there is considerable political pressure to make
the transition to Internet voting, so the question is whether
it is profitable to develop or purchase a new generation of
voting machines at all. A better direction, in our view, is in-
vestigating how verifiability can be increased in the case
of remote electronic voting. Here, it is typically impossi-
ble to maintain a paper trail without re-introducing tradi-
tional means of communication, such as regular mail. Even
then, it is hard to make sure that the electronic trail and the
paper trail match, even in case all electronic equipment op-
erates properly.3
Traditionally, two types of verifiability have been distin-
guished in research on electronic elections. When a system
establishes individual veriability, every voter can check if
her vote has been properly counted. In universal veriabil-
ity, anyone can check that the calculated result is correct
[18, 21]. Typically, a bulletin board or some other electronic
means is used to publish a document that represents the re-
ceived votes. Voters can look up their own vote there, and
people interested in the results can do correctness checks on
the tally.
However, these types of verifiability have been imple-
mented in very different ways. We think that at least one
more conceptual distinction is necessary to categorise the
different systems appropriately. We will introduce this dis-
tinction via an analysis of the relation between verifiability
and receipt-freeness.
2 See e.g. [25]. The notion was introduced by Rebecca Mercuri.
3 Voters may intentionally send different votes to the different trails, in
order to spoil the elections. See e.g. [31].
3. Verifiability and Receipt-Freeness
One of the basic requirements of election systems is the
resistance against coercion and vote buying. Therefore, peo-
ple should not be able to prove how they voted, even if they
want to. This makes it impossible for someone who forces
them to vote in a certain way, or someone who buys their
vote, to check if they actually complied. This requirement
is hard, if not impossible, to realise in an environment with-
out public control, as opposed to the classical polling booth.
People can watch over your shoulder if you are not guaran-
teed a private environment for voting, and thereby obtain
proof of your vote [26].4 Some scientists hold the view that
this and other security problems make it advisable not to im-
plement Internet voting at all [14].
There is empirical evidence, however, that vote buying
may “survive the secret ballot”, despite isolating the voter
in a polling booth [5]. This means that buying does happen,
even if individual votes are secret. Brusco et al. [5] mention
three possible explanations for the fact that voters comply
to the buyer’s wishes in spite of the secret ballot. These in-
clude the expectation of future benefits if enough people in
a district vote for the desired party, feelings of moral obli-
gation of the voters, and the preference of immediate bene-
fits over vague political promises. Similar effects may exist
for coercion.
Thus, the fact that people vote in a non-controlled envi-
ronment does not need to be a fundamental problem com-
pared to the current situation. If the risks of vote buying and
coercion increase at all, the risks are the same as those in-
volved in postal ballots. Organisational and legal measures
may be put in place to minimise the risks.
If we accept this argument, there is still a second problem
involved. For it is one thing that people physically present
at the act of voting can influence the voter, the possibil-
ity to prove remotely that you voted for a certain party is
worse. This means that people could provide proof to a co-
ercer or get money for their votes after they voted them-
selves. This is more convenient for an attacker than buying
or stealing access codes and casting all votes herself. There
is a trade-off between verifiability and resistance against co-
ercion here. If every voter can check if her vote has been
counted correctly, i.e. if the vote in the results correspond-
ing to her own vote maps to the right party or candidate, then
she can also show this check to a coercer or buyer as a proof.
Thus, we generally do not want a voter to be able to show
a proof of her vote after the election is over. In the litera-
4 Some systems introduce “practice ballots” or similar measures to pre-
vent such attacks. However, these measures severely limit verifiabil-
ity, because the tallier still needs to be able to distinguish real bal-
lots from practice ballots, whereas the attacker should not be able
to detect this via the means of verification offered to the voter. See
e.g. http://zoo.cs.yale.edu/classes/cs490/03-04b/adam.wolf/Paper.pdf,
consulted December 9, 2005.
ture, this restricted property is often called receipt-freeness
[4, 11]. 5
Some systems, among which the RIES system, do indeed
allow a voter to check after the elections for which party
or candidate her vote has been counted [2, 3, 12, 21, 34].
These systems are therefore not receipt-free in the techni-
cal sense. Although the fact that people can see what they
voted for after the elections may increase trust in the sys-
tem, the lack of resistance against coercion and vote buying
makes these systems debatable candidates in elections for
which we cannot be sure that the chances of buying and co-
ercion are low.
In many systems [6, 15, 18], this is remedied by allow-
ing a voter to check that her vote has been counted, but not
how. The idea is that it is impossible, or at least computa-
tionally infeasible, for an attacker to make the system count
a different vote for this voter in case the check turns out to
be OK. Receipt-freeness can thus be provided by limiting
the information that a voter can retrieve about her vote af-
ter the election, while still assuring cryptographically that
this is indeed a proof that the vote has been counted for the
party or candidate that was chosen during the election.
Thus, the relation between individual verifiability and
receipt-freeness gives rise to a distinction between two dif-
ferent types of individual verifiability. In the following sec-
tion, we discuss the different options for verifiability in re-
mote electronic elections based on this observation.
4. Variants of Verifiability
Following the analysis of the relation between individ-
ual verifiability and receipt-freeness, we observed a distinc-
tion between two kinds of individual verifiability. We will
label these two types based on an analogy with the distinc-
tion between classical logic and constructive logic. In clas-
sical logic, one can prove an existential formula without ac-
tually showing an instance in the domain that satisfies this
formula.6 In constructive logic, one has to produce a wit-
ness in order to prove the existential formula. We argue that
there is a similarity with verifiability in electronic voting
here.7
When a voter can only verify that her vote has been
counted, this amounts to showing that a certain vote exists
in the results that can be attributed to this voter. However,
the actual witness (i.e. the choice this voter made) cannot be
5 If a system is resistant against coercion even if the coercer can inter-
act with the voter during voting, the term coercion-resistance is some-
times used instead of receipt-freeness [16]. In order to avoid confu-
sion, we consequently use the term receipt-freeness here.
6 Equivalently, one shows that the negation of the formula does not hold
for all instances.
7 The analogy does not hold for computational issues around finding a
witness. Still, we think that it is useful for understanding what the dif-
ference is between the two types of verifiability.
recovered from the verification procedure. Here, the voter
will believe that her vote was recorded correctly if the elec-
tion authority can show something that proves the existence
of a vote by this voter in the results, without re-examining
the original vote.8 Proving the existence of something with-
out showing a witness can be done in classical logic. We
will label this type of verifiability classical individual veri-
ability.
On the other hand, some systems allow a voter to check
afterwards for which candidate her vote has been counted.
This means that the actual instance of a vote is shown as
a proof to the voter. Here, the voter does not believe the
election authority unless she can reproduce the original vote
from the results. This corresponds to the proof of an exis-
tential formula in constructive logic. Therefore, we will la-
bel this type of verifiability constructive individual veria-
bility.
Definition 1 Classical individual veriability is the prop-
erty of an election system that a voter can verify that her
vote has been counted correctly based on a document rep-
resenting the received votes, without being able to recon-
struct her choice from that document.9
Definition 2 Constructive individual veriability is the
property of an election system that a voter can ver-
ify that her vote has been counted correctly by reconstruct-
ing her choice from a document representing the received
votes.
The first type of individual verifiability has become fairly
standard in computer science discussions on voting sys-
tems. However, the second type has been used in practice as
well, and we think these developments deserve some con-
sideration from both a scientific and a political perspective.
For universal verifiability we can make a similar distinc-
tion. We take universal verifiability, to prevent confusion,
to mean that any observer can verify that the nal tally is
correct, given a document representing the received votes.
Thus, universal verifiability does not necessarily mean that
anyone can check that all cast votes have been included in
this document.
Definition 3 Classical universal veriability is the prop-
erty of an election system that it can be shown that the tally
is correct given a document representing the received votes,
without all the data necessary to perform the calculation
being publicly accessible.
Definition 4 Constructive universal veriability is the
property of an election system that all data necessary for
8 Equivalently, one shows that it is not the case that one’s vote has not
been counted.
9 All types of proof discussed in this section may be relative to crypto-
graphic assumptions.
calculating the result from a document representing the re-
ceived votes are publicly accessible, and that a verier can
compute the tally from this set independently of the elec-
tion authorities.
Systems in which votes are encrypted with public keys
of talliers or mix servers typically establish classical uni-
versal verifiability, e.g. via zero-knowledge proofs by these
servers that show that they did their job correctly, or via ho-
momorphic encryption schemes [6, 18, 24]. This proves that
there is a set of votes corresponding to the published doc-
ument and to the tally, but the calculation of the tally from
the document is not public. Constructive universal verifia-
bility is not possible in this case, unless the private keys are
made public after the elections. However, this typically vi-
olates secrecy requirements; especially in the case of mix
servers, the encryption is intended to maintain secrecy of
the individual votes.
In the REVS system [15], the private key of the election
authorities is published, but this also sacrifices the receipt-
freeness of the system. In the system proposed by Kim and
Oh [18], it seems to be possible to publish keys after the
election as well. However, this system is only receipt-free if
the voter keeps her private key secret, which she will typ-
ically not do if she wants to sell her vote. The designated
verifier proof used in this system, which could seem a good
way to achieve constructive individual verifiability without
sacrificing receipt-freeness, only works if the voter has a
strong motive to keep her private key to herself, even in case
she can get money for it.
Systems which only use public functions to calculate the
result from the set of received votes typically do establish
constructive universal verifiability [12, 21, 34]. However,
these systems need special measures to prevent the votes
from being linked to individual voters. Because the received
votes are used in public calculations of results, without any
intermediate trusted computations that scramble them, the
link between voter and vote should be destroyed in a non-
trusted environment beforehand. In the UK, the situation is
even more complicated due to the requirement that this link
can be recovered in special cases [34].
Moreover, all the systems we included in our research
that offered constructive universal verifiability, also offered
constructive individual verifiability, and are therefore not
receipt-free. For example, the RIES system used in the
Netherlands [12] establishes both constructive individual
verifiability and constructive universal verifiability. Hash
functions are used to publish the links between all possible
votes and the corresponding candidates before the elections.
The original votes are only derivable from a secret handed
to the voter. The confidentiality of these secrets is achieved
via organisational security measures, in the same way that
identification codes for bank cards are handed out. After the
elections a table of received votes is published. By comput-
ing hashes, individual voters can check for which party or
candidate their vote has been registered, and any observer
can calculate the result from the list of received votes.
Thus, systems that allow constructive individual verifia-
bility and constructive universal verifiability are beginning
to be used in practice, in small-scale or low-risk elections.
Meanwhile, many advanced cryptographic systems that es-
tablish classical individual verifiability and classical uni-
versal verifiability are being developed. We also saw that
when the latter type of systems is adapted in order to of-
fer constructive universal verifiability, constructive individ-
ual verifiability seems to appear as a side-effect, and receipt-
freeness is thereby sacrificed. But which combination of in-
dividual and universal verifiability is most desirable? And
why do we care?
5. The Political Issue
In his famous study “Do artifacts have politics?”, Lang-
don Winner showed that technological designs may have
political implications [36]. These may occur either inten-
tionally or unintentionally. Winner’s famous example of in-
tentional political effects concerns the building of bridges in
New York between 1920 and 1970 that were too low for the
buses of public transport, and therefore the lower income
classes, to pass underneath. One can easily imagine similar
things happening unintentionally as well. Since then, many
cases of such influences have been investigated, and many
theories about how they come about have been developed in
philosophy of technology and science and technology stud-
ies (STS).
We may assume similar effects, be they unintentional,
occurring in Internet voting technology. Internet voting will
undoubtedly, depending on the way in which it is imple-
mented, make certain things possible and others impossi-
ble, just as the New York bridges did. One can easily imag-
ine that an Internet voting system will, depending on the
types of verifiability that are offered, include different vot-
ers in different ways in the election procedure, and thereby
change the image of and trust in democracy.
In this sense, choosing a particular kind of verifiability
in a particular experiment is not a choice that only influ-
ences this particular system. Instead, the type of verifiabil-
ity offered and the surrounding practices in the elections
may mediate the idea that people have of elections. For ex-
ample, if the RIES system is successful in an experiment
with elections for the local water management authorities,
people may start to think that constructive individual veri-
fiability is a good thing in general. People may also won-
der why they cannot verify their choice in the same way in
a later election that uses a different system.
Thus, we would like to stress that choosing a particu-
lar kind of verifiability in an experiment may have politi-
cal consequences, not only for the elections that the system
is being used in, but also in terms of expectations that are
raised about future elections. Therefore, we urge both scien-
tists and politicians to consider these consequences in their
decisions on designing or using a certain system.
6. What Proof Do We Prefer?
Now, how can we decide which kind of verifiability we
wish to implement or use? Because of the role of voting
systems in people’s experience of democracy, basing a de-
cision on technical requirements only is not the way to go.
Technology, and especially a politically sensitive one such
as electronic voting, occupies a place in people’s lifeworlds,
i.e. their daily experiences and acts [13]. The trust that peo-
ple have in a voting system is the basic value here, to which
the technical requirements are only secondary [10, 29, 28].
Based on a phenomenological approach to technologi-
cal innovation [13, 35] and the work on trust by Luhmann
[19, 20], we think that there are two basic ways of acquir-
ing trust in large-scale technology such as electronic vot-
ing:
• connecting to experiences that people are already fa-
miliar with (focusing on familiarity of experience);
• connecting to a clear vision of a future good to be
achieved, for which democratic support exists (focus-
ing on expectations of action).
In the case of voting, a good example of the former strat-
egy is the introduction of the Nedap voting machines in the
Netherlands in the mid-nineties. Because the layout of the
interface of the voting machines was very similar to the pre-
viously used paper ballots, one of the reasons that the sys-
tem was so easily accepted may have been the familiarity
of the interface. Now that people are already familiar with
voting machines, the introduction of a Voter Verified Au-
dit Trail can be considered an example of the latter strat-
egy, since there is a strong public agreement on the benefi-
cial properties of audit trails.
Public consensus about the necessity of verifiability in
remote electronic elections appears to be fairly strong as
well. Following the theory of Smits on adoption of new
technologies [32, 33], we argue that this consensus is not
only based on scientifically assessable risks, but also on
the discontinuities that are perceived between paper elec-
tions and electronic elections in terms of transparency. The
“black box” character of technology may be seen as caus-
ing a clash between the cultural categories of democracy
and technology. Although Schoenmakers [31] argued that
we can “compensate for the lack of transparency” by means
of cryptography — an approach that led to an impressive
amount of research — we think that transparency is a too
important attribute of democracy to allow for such easy
replacement. We would welcome more empirical research
into such issues.
In case we choose to implement verifiability features, we
have to face the fact that people are generally not familiar
with vote and result verification, and people will probably
not be happy with their verifiability if the complete election
system is turned upside down. So how can we maintain fa-
miliarity in Internet elections if people are not familiar with
verification, but at the same time demand the possibility of
verification of the results? The best we can do is preserve as
many of the things that people are familiar with in current
elections, while offering verification to make Internet elec-
tions acceptable. Two main demands, which are not only
functional requirements, but also part of a ritual that estab-
lishes familiarity with elections, can be mentioned here:
• the demand of the secret ballot;10
• the demand of the public character of vote counting.11
How do these requirements relate to the various types
of verifiability? In the case of individual verifiability, the
demand of the secret ballot implies that constructive indi-
vidual verifiability is not desirable. Thus, from the perspec-
tive of connecting to existing experiences, we should choose
classical individual verifiability. This does not mean that we
argue for this type because of functional requirements, but
rather from an “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” perspective.
Unless there is democratic consensus about the desirability
of constructive individual verifiability, either from the point
of view of enhancing trust or from the point of view that
democracy functions better without the secret ballot (which
is held for many representational bodies such as parliament
and meetings such as party congresses), we had better stick
to the demand of the secret ballot, and implement classi-
cal individual verifiability.
However, the existing schemes that offer classical indi-
vidual verifiability, to the best of our knowledge, also offer
classical universal verifiability. The limitation of the abil-
ity of result computation to dedicated parts of the system,
with accompanied proofs of correctness, goes against the
demand of the public character of vote counting. Typically,
any encryption with a public key implies that the public
character of vote counting is being set aside, unless the cor-
responding private key is made public afterwards, which is
generally not the case. As much as the secret ballot is an im-
portant part of the ritual of voting, so is the public charac-
ter of vote counting. Therefore, we think that constructive
universal verifiability, in which any party can do an inde-
pendent calculation of the result, is preferable, unless there
is democratic consensus about arguments for the opposite
point of view.
10 Cf. Dutch constitution art. 53.2 and Dutch election law (“Kieswet”)
art. J 15.
11 Cf. Dutch election law (“Kieswet”) art. N 1, N 8 and N 9.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we distinguished between two types of in-
dividual verifiability and two types of universal verifiabil-
ity in electronic elections, based on scientific literature and
concrete developments. We made this distinction based on
an analogy with proofs in classical and constructive logic,
and labelled the corresponding types of verifiability classi-
cal and constructive verifiability, respectively. This distinc-
tion is meaningful both for individual and universal verifia-
bility, and we think that it is a useful tool for explicating the
hidden assumptions of the way in which verifiability is re-
alised in concrete systems.
We argued that choices for particular kinds of verifiabil-
ity in experiments may have political implications, not only
for the specific election that a system is used in, but also
in terms of expectations of future elections. Therefore, it
is wise to attempt to arrive at political consensus about the
kinds of verifiability that are desirable. We argued that even
if verifiability is widely accepted as a good thing, we still
have to maintain familiarity with elections in order to make
the whole system acceptable. The best we can do here is
maintain the existing properties of vote secrecy and public
counting. This can be done with a system that establishes
classical individual verifiability and constructive universal
verifiability.
Instead of the current scientific focus on public key
crypto systems, which do not have the property of construc-
tive universal verifiability, and the practical focus on RIES-
like systems, which are not receipt-free, we encourage sci-
entists to investigate the possibilities for designing a sys-
tem with a combination of classical individual verifiabil-
ity and constructive universal verifiability. Intuitively, this
means that a document is published after the elections in
which voters can see that their vote is present (or absent, in
case they did not vote), not what they voted for, but from
which anyone can compute the final result.
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